

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

DATE: 03/26/97
PAGE: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : NSA
RECORD NUMBER : 144-10001-10097

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : NSA
FROM : NSA
TO : HCF

~~ERI~~

3/0 [] T1657-63: [] AMBASSADOR REPORTS SOVIET REACTION TO [R]

DATE : 11/30/63
PAGES : 1

[] 44 USC 2107(5)(g)(2)(D)(i)

SUBJECTS :
[] DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY
USSR, REACTION TO ASSASSINATION

[R]
~~ERI~~

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : X
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/10/93

OPENING CRITERIA :
ORIGINATING AGENCY'S DETERMINATION REQUIRED

COMMENTS :
~~CONTAINS SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION~~

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

[] [] WS 15532

3/0 [] 'T1657-63
IS 30 Nov 2027Z P
Dist: HCF
ST 300

[] AMBASSADOR REPORTS SOVIET REACTION TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S
ASSASSINATION

[] Foreign Ministry
Msg Nr: 201.

29 Nov 63
--

In reference to the repercussions in the Soviet Union to the assassination of President KENNEDY.

Basing the first on personal judgment and the rest on information from reliable diplomatic sources, I will discuss the following evaluations:

The deep grief produced here by the above-mentioned assassination was absolutely spontaneous and due to the high culture of the Soviet people which enables them [1 gr G] rise above world actions as well as to the traditional Russian sentimentality.

As soon as the news was known, and in the face of possible international complications, the military authorities intensified security measures which have now returned to normal.

High Soviet officials are preoccupied with the stand the new President of the United States may take on everything regarding Cuba, and, although MIKOYAN seemed to have been (B val impressed) after speaking with the President and other high-ranking United States officials, they are moderately calm. Soviet leaders will wait to learn how the matters of the purchase of wheat will be settled in the United States as well as the reaching new U.S.-Soviet cultural agreement, for the purpose of gaining a clearer idea of the policy in question.

MS 19

CN []

TI 29 Nov 63 []

3/0 [] 'T1657-63

[] 44 USC 2107(5)(g)(2)(D)(i)

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1 PAGE(S)

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~